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The author surveys and discusses recent decisions, rule
changes and legislation concerning various aspects of Florida
Civil Procedure. The topics dealt with include jurisdiction,
venue, class actions, parties, discovery, judgments, summary
judgment, jury trials, jury instructions and dismissal.
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* The decisions surveyed in this article appear in volumes 306 through 336 of the South-
ern Reporter, Second Series. In addition, the survey covers laws enacted by the 1974 and 1975
sessions of the Florida legislature.
** Member of Florida Bar, Associate with the firm of Paul, Landy, Beiley & Yacos,
Miami, Florida.
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I. COURTS, JUDGES, AND ATTORNEYS
A. Court Administration
The amendment to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.020 pro-
vides that it is the duty of every judge to rule upon every matter
submitted to him within a reasonable amount of time. Any matter
that is held under advisement for more than sixty days must be
reported to the chief judge of the circuit at the end of that calendar
month.'
B. Jurisdiction of the Courts
A trial court's jurisdiction over a case generally divests when a
final judgment has been rendered.2 In Chipola Nurseries, Inc. v.
Division of Administration3 plaintiff and defendant stipulated to a
final judgment. Defendant was awarded sums for condemnation of
its properties. The "final" judgment, however, did not include inter-
est "which . . . together with attorneys' fees and costs of these
proceedings will be further set by this court"' as provided by law.
On January 15, 1975, about six months after the final judgment, the
court entered a partial judgment as to costs. The parties then at-
tempted to stipulate to interest, but were unable to agree. Finally,
on January 28, 1976, defendant filed a motion for an order assessing
interest.
The trial court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the
defendant's motion. On appeal, plaintiff-appellee contended that
the trial court had lost jurisdiction during the lapse between the
entry of "final" judgment and the filing of defendant-appellant's
motion for an order assessing interest. Plaintiff-appellee's conten-
tion was that the assessing of interest should be treated like the
taxing of costs and therefore must be taxed within a reasonable
time after final judgment. Since the adjudication of interest was
delayed beyond a reasonable time, jurisdiction was lost. However,
the District Court of Appeal, First District, disagreed and stated:
"Costs arise out of the litigation itself and are not a claim or part
of a claim which forms the basis for the suit."5
1. In re The Florida Bar, Rules of Civil Procedure, 339 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1976).
2. Alderman v. Puritan Dairy, Inc., 145 Fla. 292, 294, 199 So. 44, 45 (1940).
3. 335 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
4. Id. at 618.
5. Id. See Roberts v. Askew, 260 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1972).
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The court noted that the mere labeling of the judgment as
"final" did not make it such unless, in fact, it was a final judg-
ment-leaving nothing further for judicial determination. Since the
question of interest was left for future determination, judicial labor
was not at end. Thus, the trial court had jurisdiction to assess
interest.
During the survey period, two cases arose involving jurisdic-
tional amount. Florida Statutes sections 26.012(2)(a) and 34.01
(1975) set this amount at $2,500.00 for the circuit court. In
Columbus Mills, Inc. v. Dionne' plaintiff filed suit in circuit court.
Defendant counterclaimed for damages, but the counterclaim did
not meet the $2,500.00 jurisdictional prerequisite. The trial court
therefore dismissed the counterclaim. On appeal, the District Court
of Appeal, Second District, held that a defendant may assert a
counterclaim for damages in a sum less than the court's ordinary
jurisdictional minimum. In PTS of Gainesville, Inc. v. Olivetti
Corp.7 plaintiff and defendant entered into two contracts. Each con-
tract contained a provision for attorneys' fees in the event of default.
Plaintiff sued for breach of contract, in circuit court alleging dam-
ages of $1,950.00 on one contract, damages of $1,086.00 on the other,
and attorneys' fees on both. Plaintiff claimed the jurisdictional
amount by virtue of its $1,950.00 claim, plus reasonable attorneys'
fees. The District Court of Appeal, First District, agreed:
Attorney's fees which are expressly promised are as much a part
of the amount involved in the suit for the purpose of determining
the jurisdiction as are the principal and interest. Ring v. Mer-
chants' Broom Co., 1914, 68 Fla. 515, 67 So. 132. The test for
determining jurisdiction of the circuit court is the amount
claimed and put into controversy in good faith.'
C. Forum Non Conveniens
Although a court may have jurisdiction over a cause, it may,
upon application by a party, choose not to exercise it.' The test for
applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens is two-pronged. Con-
6. 328 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
7. 334 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
8. Id. at 325.
9. See Adams v. Seaboard Coast Line RR, 224 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969). Forum
non conveniens sometimes is used to transfer cases because of inconvenient forum under
Florida Statute section 47.122 (1975).
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venience is not the determinative criterion. It is necessary that the
cause of action arise in a jurisdiction outside Florida and that the
parties are nonresidents. 0 Thus, in an action filed in Florida by
Florida residents to recover for injuries arising out of the collision
of an automobile with a truck in New Mexico, the doctrine was
inapplicable, and the Florida residents were not denied access to
their own state courts."
D. Judges
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held recently
that in the absence of special circumstances such as mistake or
fraud perpetrated upon a court, a successor judge does not have
authority to set aside a discretionary order which had been entered
by his predecessor on the same facts. In City of Miami Beach v.
Chadderton"2 an order compelling discovery was entered requiring
the plaintiff to produce requested information within one month.
The order provided that if the plaintiff failed to do so, the action
would be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff did not comply but the
successor judge refused to dismiss. Usually, sanctions under Florida
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.380 are invoked by a two-step process: (1)
an order compelling discovery and (2) an order of sanctions upon
failure to comply with the discovery. As the dissent indicated, the
successor judge may have been within the general rule of not modi-
fying or reversing the final order of a predecessor in that the order
in question might be considered only the first order compelling dis-
covery and therefore, only interlocutory in nature.'" However, the
majority considered his refusal to dismiss with prejudice, as ordered
by his predecessor, to be error.
E. Costs
Taxing costs involves the exercise of discretion by the trial
judge. In Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Scott 4 the prevailing party was
awarded the costs of taking depositions. In affirming the award, the
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the test for
10, Morgan v. Ande, 313 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
11. Killingsworth v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 327 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
12. 306 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
13. Id. at 560.
14. 311 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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allowing costs is not whether; the depositions were actually offered
in evidence or used extensively in impeachment of witnesses, but
whether they served a useful purpose. The court reasoned that this
test will foster the reasonable and judicious use of the discovery
process by affording judges the opportunity to deny an allowance of
costs for excessive depositions, although used at trial, or read into
the record for purposes of impeachment.
F. Attorneys
Rule 1.030 has been amended to require that all pleadings filed
by an attorney, or by a party representing himself, include the tele-
phone number of the person filing the pleading. 5
II. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
A. In General
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, has held that
service on a husband by leaving process at the home with his wife
is valid regardless of whether the husband actually received knowl-
edge of the service.'6 The standard is whether, at the time of service,
circumstances were such that it could be presumed that knowledge
of the service would be brought to his attention.
A recent opinion involved defendants who were engaged in a
joint venture."1 The court reasoned that a joint venture is not a legal
entity in the same sense as a partnership, even though the distinc-
tion is often blurred" and held that service of process on one mem-
ber of the joint venture was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on
another member.
B. Substitute Service
Florida Statutes section 48.031 (1975) provides that service of
process may be perfected by leaving it at the party's place of abode
with "some person of the family over fifteen years of age." In order
to qualify as "some person of the family," kinship by blood or mar-
riage is not necessary."' It is sufficient that service is made upon a
15. In re The Florida Bar, Rules of Civil Procedure, 339 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1976).
16. Barnett Bank v. Folsom, 306 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 2d Dist 1975).
17. Elting Center Corp. v. Diversified Title Corp., 306 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
18. Id.
19. Pyles v. Beall, 37 Fla. 557, 20 So. 778 (Fla. 1896).
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person who has some permanency of abode on the premises. How-
ever, in Couts v. Maryland Casualty Co.,20 service of process was
insufficient where it was made upon a mother-in-law who was only
visiting for a few days. The court in Couts distinguished
Sangmeister v. McElnea2' where the "person of the family" require-
ment was met by serving a relative who was visiting for four months.
C. Personal Service
Florida Statutes section 48.193 (1975) describes certain acts
which subject persons to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state.
Included are causes of action arising from the ownership, use, or
possession of any real property within the state. In Griffin v. Zinn2
a plaintiff had obtained a judgment in Ohio on a note against an
Ohio defendant. Plaintiff filed an action in Florida to enforce the
Ohio judgment. The complaint described real estate in Florida
owned by defendant and plaintiff submitted an affidavit stating
that defendant had promised to pay the note out of the Florida
property. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held the
complaint insufficient to meet the long arm requirments of section
48.193. In order to have in personam jurisdiction under that section,
there must be a direct affiliation or nexus between the basis of the
controversy and the Florida property, as where a plaintiff claims
damages resulting from the negligent maintenance of Florida prop-
erty owned by a nonresident. The Ohio judgment had no such direct
affiliation to the Florida property. The court indicated that plaintiff
might have been able to initiate a quasi in rem action, but he failed
to do so.
D. Constructive Service
In a recent dissolution action, 3 service of process was effected
pursuant to Florida Statutes sections 49.10(1)(b), 49.11, and 49.12
(1975), whereby notices of dissolution proceedings were posted in
three prominent places in the county of residence of the defendant-
wife. Notice was also mailed to her last known address. At trial, the
husband moved for a default. This motion was denied on the ground
20. 306 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
21. 278 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
22. 318 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
23. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 329 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1976).
[Vol. 31:869
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that service of process was insufficient because the service statute,
section 49.10(1)(b), was deemed unconstitutional by the trial judge.
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed, and held that due process
does not prohibit a state from devising a constitutional method for
service of process where personal service is unduly expensive for an
indigent party in a dissolution proceeding. The court found that the
procedure utilized was reasonably designed and calculated to pro-
vide actual notice of the lawsuit, and therefore was constitutional.
In Risman v. WhittahrH the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, held that service of process by the Florida long arm stat-
utes, sections 48.193 and 48.194, is an alternative to service of pro-
cess by publication under Florida Statutes section 49.021. Even
though section 49.021 provides that "[w]here personal service of
process cannot be had, service of process by publication may be had
upon any party, natural or corporate, known or unknown, ' 25 the
long arm statute is not mandatory because it uses the word "may."
The court reasoned that the policy behind the long arm statute is
to afford the citizens of the state a forum for causes of action arising
from activities of nonresidents within the state. It is not designed
to make more difficult or limit the exercise of the rights of Florida
plaintiffs. Further, it would be more time consuming and expensive
to achieve in personam jurisdiction by personal service upon non-
residents under the long arm statute when compared to in rem
jurisdiction by service by publication. Thus, Florida plaintiffs are
free to use either method "depending upon the practicabilities and
the kind of jurisdiction they [wish] to obtain. 26
III. VENUE
In Florida Forms, Inc. v. Barkett Computer Services, Inc.,
2
plaintiff sued defendant in Orange County, Florida, the principal
place of plaintiff's business, to recover money owed on a note.
Defendant's principal place of business was in Dade County, Flor-
ida. Upon motion by defendant, the cause was transferred to Dade
County. On appeal, the Fourth District reversed. Although the elec-
tion of venue is with plaintiff, the burden of pleading and proving
24. 326 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
25. FLA. STAT. § 49.021 (1975)(emphasis added).
26. 326 So. 2d at 214.
27. 311 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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that venue is improper or should be changed is upon defendant.
Although the note did not specify the place of payment, "[i]n the
absence of an agreement as to the place of payment it is implied
that payment is to be made where the payee resides or has an
established place of business."28 Therefore, the cause of action ac-
crued in Orange County and venue was proper in that county. In
addition, defendant lacked good reason for a change of venue.
IV. ACTIONS
During the survey period, numerous cases arose involving com-
plaints, counterclaims, cross claims, third party complaints, and
defenses. However, the most significant decisions involved class ac-
tions, and this section will deal only with them.
In Paulino v. Hardisterl the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, decided a question of res judicata as it related to actions
against class defendants. If the parties who represent the defendant
class are adequate representatives, absent members of the class are
bound by the judgment in the class action. In determining whether
the representative was adequate, the court considered that: (1) the
representative conducted a vigorous defense including certiorari to
the Supreme Court of Florida and the United States Supreme
Court; (2) all defenses which reasonably might have been available
to defeat the claims of plaintiffs against all members of the class
were raised; and (3) defendant was represented by competent coun-
sel.
In Paulino plaintiff sought to enjoin all residents who had
mobile homes in a certain subdivision from keeping them on the
premises. The joined class of defendants were the 'legal owners of
or parties who have equitable interests in certain lots within' the
subdivision and were said to have placed mobile homes on the lots
'for the purpose of rental, for sale . . . and for use as residences in
direct violation of the restrictive covenants attaching to said lots."'30
Only named defendant members of the class were served with pro-
cess. One of the members of the class defended actively against the
action and the trial court ordered the class defendants to remove
28. Id. at 731. Accord, First Int'l Realty Inv. Corp. v. Cochran, 314 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1975).
29. 306 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
30. Id. at 127.
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trailers and mobile homes from the subject premises.
The court stated that a determination of whether unknown
class defendants were represented adequately was largely a matter
of notice. Thus, the "case present[ed] a classic confrontation be-
tween the principles inherent in an effective class action and those
applicable to constitutional due process." 3' The Second District sug-
gested that with regard to further class actions against defendant
class members the court should determine whether the named
members of the class adequately represent the interests of the ab-
sent members. Inherent in a positive determination is a finding that
the notice given to absent members of the class increases the like-
lihood that those parties appearing on behalf of the class will ade-
quately represent the interests of the class.
The court should determine how notice of the suit may best be
given to absent members of the class. One possible method might
be written notice to all ascertainable members of the class, or under
the circumstances, the court might decide that publication or some
other kind of notice will be sufficient. The cost of this notice should
be born initially by the party seeking relief against the class.
The court also stated that if an absent member makes a timely
request for joinder as an additional named party, the joinder should
be liberally granted. In the event an absent member of the class
does not know of the pending suit, and judgment is entered, the
member should be able to attack the court's conclusion, pursuant
to a Rule 1.540(b)(1) motion for relief on the ground that the named
members were not adequate class representatives. The basis for the
1.540 motion would be surprise.
Finally, if the court concludes that the named parties are ade-
quate representatives of the class, all other matters decided in the
suit would be res judicata.
While indicating these guidelines for future decisions, the court
did not need to follow them in the instant case. It held that the class
defendants were represented adequately since the class representa-
tive presented all the pertinent evidence and pursued all possible
avenues of relief. Consequently, the judgment against the class was
affirmed.
In Rosenwasser v. Frager" the District Court of Appeal, Third
31. Id.
32. 307 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975). See Harrell v. Hess Oil & Chem. Corp., 287 So.
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District, held that it was per se inappropriate for condominium
owners to bring a class action against a developer for compensatory
and punitive damages on the basis of alleged fraudulent misrepre-
sentations. The unit owners sought to avoid a ninety-nine year rec-
reational lease on the ground that they were fraudulently induced
to enter into it. The alleged misrepresentation was made in a writ-
ten brochure describing lakeside swimming, sandy beaches and
courtesy bus service, none of which was provided.
The class action allegation was stricken from the complaint and
the cause remanded to the trial court. Subsequently, plaintiff filed
a motion for leave to join additional parties. This was granted, and
thirty condominium unit owners were joined as plaintiffs, each as-
serting fraud and deceit. Each plaintiff's claim was based upon a
separate and independent purchase agreement. In reviewing an in-
terlocutory appeal of the joinder, the Third District affirmed.3 The
court reasoned that multifariousness occurs when distinct and dis-
connected subjects or causes are joined in the same complaint, or
when parties, either defendants or plaintiffs, who have no common
interest in the subject matter litigation, are joined in the same
litigation. In the instant case, all the plaintiffs were condominium
unit owners in the same condominium complex. It was developed
by the same defendant and all the sales contracts contained identi-
cal provisions relating to the recreational lease. It is interesting to
note that although the condominium unit owners initially could not
maintain the suit as a class action, they were allowed to maintain
it on the same claim by all joining in as plaintiffs.
V. PARTIES
Rule 1.260(c) provides:
In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued
by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion
directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substi-
tuted in the action or joined with the original party. Service of
the motion shall be made as provided in subdivision (a) of this
rule.
2d 291 (Fla. 1973); Osceola Groves v. Wiley, 78 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1955); Equitable Life Assur-
ance Soc'y of the United States, 275 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
33. Rossenwasser v. Frager, 322 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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.In Schmidt v. Mueller34 plaintiff sued defendants for real estate
commissions and for interference with his contractual relationship.
During the nonjury trial, plaintiff alluded to having incorporated his
real estate business and having assigned his business assets to that
corporation. Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the
new corporation was not before the court as a party-plaintiff, and
therefore the real party in interest was not represented. This motion
was granted. In the order of dismissal it was noted that the plaintiff
had made an oral motion to substitute the newly formed corporation
but the court ruled that the motion was too late. On appeal, the
Second District reversed. Since Rule 1.260(c) specifically provides
for continuance of the action or substitution of the proper party in
situations like the one at bar, it was error to dismiss. This was
especially clear because there was no showing by defendant that
prejudice would have resulted from a continuance or substitution.
The court reasoned that had defendant been so prejudiced, the rules
are sufficiently flexible to allow a court to grant further relief by way
of continuance or further discovery.
In Rader v. Otis Elevator Co.35 plaintiff was injured on a hospi-
tal elevator in Jacksonville. He sued the hospital, alleging negligent
maintenance of the elevator. The hospital, in turn, filed a third-
party complaint against the elevator company. Prior to trial, the
hospital and plaintiff settled the claim. The hospital and the eleva-
tor company went to trial on the third party complaint and the
elevator company was exonerated. Subsequently, the original plain-
tiff sued the elevator company for negligent maintenance of the
elevator. The trial court entered a final summary judgment against
plaintiff, holding that the issue of liability as to the elevator com-
pany had previously been submitted to the jury in the form of the
third-party claim by the hospital against the elevator company.
On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, First District, re-
versed. The court reasoned that since Rule 1.180 permits, but does
not require, a plaintiff to assert a claim against a third party defen-
dant, the original plaintiff could bring an action against the elevator
company after the third party action had been litigated. The court
stated clearly that
34. 335 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
35. 327 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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[u]ntil [Rule 1.180] is amended to require, and not merely
permit, the assertion of a plaintiffs claim against a third party
defendant which arises out of the transaction in issue between
plaintiff and defendant, estoppel must be predicated on a judg-
ment between adversaries, not merely on an opportunity to liti-
gate."
Therefore, the subsequent assertion of the plaintiff's claim against
the prior third-party defendant, although arising out of the identical
transaction in issue In the prior action, did not give rise to estoppel
or res judicata in the subsequent litigation.
In 1975, the legislature adopted Florida Statutes section
768.134(1) 31 which in relevant part provides: "Furthermore, in any
civil medical malpractice action, the trial on the merits shall be
conducted without any reference to insurance, insurance coverage,
or joinder of an insurer as a co-defendant in the suit."
The legislature's intent in enacting this section, according to
the Supreme Court of Florida in Carter v. Sparkman,3 was "to bar
only 'any reference' to the joinder of insurers rather than the joinder
itself." 3 , The court also stated that rules governing references to
insurance or insurers during the course of a trial are procedural
matters. To the extent that the legislature attempted to control
such references during the course of trial, it acted beyond its power
because only the court, not the legislature, may adopt rules of proce-
dure. Nevertheless, the court held that in view of the wisdom of
continuing the policy expressed in the statute, it would adopt Rule
1.450(e) as a new rule of procedure for all medical malpractice trials,
conducted or in process under the medical malpractice statute. Rule
1.450(e) states: "In any civil medical malpractice action, the trial
on the merits shall be conducted without any reference to insurance,
to insurance coverage, or to the joinder of an insurer as co-defendant
in the suit."' 0
VI. DISCOVERY
A. Scope
In Brown v. Bridges" a recent District Court of Appeal, Second
36. Id. at 858.
37. Renumbered to FLA. STAT. § 768.47(1)(1977).
38. 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 741 (1977).
39. Id. at 806.
40. Id.
41. 327 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
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District, case, the issue before the court was whether plaintiff could
compel the defendant to submit to a videotaped deposition wherein
defendant would be required to demonstrate karate maneuvers
which he had been teaching plaintiff when she was injured. Defen-
dant was compelled to demonstrate the maneuvers in question be-
cause they were relevant to the transaction. "While it is true that
the demonstration process may not precisely reenact petitioner's
instructional techniques, that argument is more properly related to
the use of the deposition at trial and to the limited uses which
respondents can make of videotape prior to trial."42
It is interesting to compare Brown to the District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District's decision in Florida Keys Boys Club, Inc. v.
Pelekis.43 The latter case involved allegations that a signature on a
deed was a forgery. Plaintiff moved, pursuant to Rules 1.350 and
1.280 to have Defendant write, fifteen times with each hand, the
various signatures which he allegedly had forged. The trial court's
order compelling this discovery was reversed by the Third District.
The court held that the rules for discovery do not authorize a court
to order a defendant to manufacture his signature for purposes of
litigation. The trial court should have required defendant to pro-
duce samples of his signature made prior to the litigation. "The
process of forced manufacturing of specimens in the hope that one
of them will afford a basis for a claim of forgery is not contemplated
by our rules of discovery.""
Rule 1.310(b)(4) has been amended to allow the taking of a
deposition by videotape at the same time that a stenographic tran-
scription is being taken. Furthermore, courts "may adopt a stan-
dard order governing the use of videotape depositions which may be
automatically applicable, upon the giving of notice of taking any
videotape deposition unless modified upon the application of any
party."45 The amended rule also provides that the court shall order
the manner of recording, preserving, and filing such depositions to
insure that they are accurate and trustworthy."
In Spencer v. Beverly,47 the issue was whether surveillance pho-
42. Id. at 875.
43. 327 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
44. Id. at 806.
45. In re The Florida Bar, Rules of Civil Procedure, 339 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1976).
46. Id.
47. 307 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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tographs taken of plaintiff after a personal injury action had been
commenced were discoverable and did not represent the work prod-
uct of counsel. In Spencer plaintiff propounded eight interrogatories
pertaining to surveillance movies of plaintiff which had been taken
by the defendant. Defendant answered the first interrogatory and
acknowledged that he had taken surveillance. However, defendant
objected to the remaining. interrogatories which requested that he
state what activities of the plaintiff were portrayed in the
surveillance movies. Defendant claimed a work product exemption
from answering the interrogatories on the ground that he intended
to use the movies solely for impeachment purposes. The trial court
held that where a party reasonably anticipates that he may use
surveillance movies for impeachment, the films should be subject
to discovery.
In concurring with the per curiam denial of certiorari, one judge
noted: "If matter is to be introduced into evidence, it is not privi-
leged as work product."4 The main question before the court was
the difference between impeachment evidence which is not subject
to discovery, and discoverable substantive evidence which relates
directly to the plaintiff's injuries and damages. Thus, the following
guide was suggested in the special concurring opinion: "If a party
possesses material he expects to use as evidence at trial, that mate-
rial is subject to discovery." 9 The rationale behind this guide is that
the discovery rules were enacted to eliminate surprise, to encourage
settlement, and to assist in arriving at the truth. The opinion also
noted that photographs and movies generally are not considered
work product.
B. Discovery Devices
1. INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES
Rule 1.340(e) has been changed to avoid duplication of papers
in court files. Specifically, it is no longer necessary to file with the
court a copy of interrogatories served on a party. All that is neces-
sary is an executed certificate of service, or an attached notice that
the interrogatores have been served, "giving date of service, the
number of interrogatories served, and the name of the party to




whom they were directed. When the original interrogatories have
been completed by the answering party, they shall be filed . .
with the court.50
2. DEPOSITIONS
In Colonnades, Inc. v. Vance Baldwin, Inc." the plaintiff of-
fered into evidence the deposition of a nonparty witness whose testi-
mony was material to plaintiff's case. The trial court allowed the
deposition into evidence on the basis that the witness stated within
the deposition that he was a resident of Birmingham, Alabama, and
that he did not expect to be in Florida and more particularly, West
Palm Beach, the site of the trial, on the date of the trial. Defendant
objected, arguing that only sworn evidence, independent of the dep-
osition itself, would be sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the
witness will not be available for trial and that the witness is more
than one hundred miles from the place of trial. On appeal, the
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that there must be
a finding by the court that the required predicate has been shown.
However, since the trial court judge has discretion as to the source,
nature, and sufficiency of the facts which he may consider, the
sworn testimony contained within the deposition was sufficient for
this purpose.
3. REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
The use of requests for admissions can be a very effective tool.
In Creel v. Government Employees Insurance Company" defendant
insurance company propounded requests for admissions to plaintiff
who failed to respond within the thirty day period set forth in Rule
1.370. Subsequently, defendant moved for entry of a summary judg-
ment. Prior to the hearing on the motion for summary judgment,
plaintiff failed to move the court to withdraw or amend the admis-
sions on the grounds of excusable neglect or some other basis. In-
stead, plaintiff attempted to controvert the admissions by filing an
affidavit prepared by his attorney three days before the hearing on
the motion for the summary judgment. The court held: "It is our
50. In re The Florida Bar, Rules of Civil Procedure, 339 So. 2d 626, 628 (Fla. 1976).
51. 318 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
52. 313 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 336 So. 2d 1170.
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view, however, that the plaintiff was unfortunately 'hoist with his
own petard.' We hold that the appellant's explanation is insufficient
to justify his failure to comply with Rule 1.370; and, therefore, the
facts as admitted support the summary judgment rendered by the
trial court."5
Recently, the following certified question was presented before
the District Court of Appeal, First District: "Must a response to a
request for admission made pursuant to Rule 1.370, . . . be signed
and sworn to by the responding party, or is the unsworn signature
of the responding party's attorney sufficient?"'" The court held
that a request for admissions may be signed only by the attorney.
The party need not sign it. Furthermore, the attorney's signature
need not be sworn. Although the former rule provided that a re-
sponse must be signed and sworn to by the party, this requirement
has been omitted from Rule 1.370 and the court reasoned by impli-
cation that the dropping of this requirement supported its decision.
C. Sanctions
In Trustees of Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty Trust v.
Sailboat Apartment Corp. 55 a mortgage and realty trust was sued for
failure to fund a building project. During the course of the litigation
and pursuant to Rule 1.380, plaintiff moved for sanctions against
the defendant for failure to answer its propounded interrogatories.
The predicate for the motion was substantially as follows:
1. Interrogatories were propounded on January 22, 1975.
2. On January 30, 1975, defendant trustees moved for a protec-
tive order which was denied on February 11, 1975.
3. On February 14, 1975, defendants filed a motion for a thirty
day extension of time to respond to the interrogatories. Pursuant
to stipulation the court extended the time for the defendants to
respond to March 20, 1975.
4. On February 23, 1975, after the stipulation, defendants filed
a motion for reconsideration of the order of February 11, 1975.
5. At the same time, defendants filed a blanket objection to all
of the interrogatories, asserting that an individual agent be ap-
53. Id. at 773.
54. Florida Fish Distrib., Inc. v. Norwegian Caribbean Lines, Inc., 328 So. 2d 240 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1976).
55. 323 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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pointed to answer all of the interrogatories, an argument pre-
viously rejected by the court.
6. On March 11, 1975, plaintiff filed a motion to strike pleadings
for noncompliance with the court's order of February 11th and
noticed same for March 14, 1975. By agreement of counsel, this
motion was never argued.
7. On March 19, 1975, the court denied defendant's motion for
rehearing, reconsideration, and protective order. Thereafter,
counsel for defendants received from plaintiffs an extension until
March 24th, 1975, to answer interrogatories.
8. On March 26, 1975, defendants filed another motion for ex-
tension of time, asserting that a good faith effort was being made
to assemble the information. They set that motion for extension
of time before the court on April 1, 1975.
9. On March 27, 1975, plaintiff filed a motion to strike the
pleadings, arguing that defendants' continued delaying tactics
were predicated upon two prejudgment hopes, a change in the
usury laws, and divestment of the trust's assets.
10. This motion to strike was noticed for hearing on April 1,
1975. At the hearing, an order denying the extension of time to
answer interrogatories was entered and defendants were given
until April 3, 1975, in which to provide full sets of answers.
11. On April 3, 1975, plaintiff's motion to strike was heard be-
fore the court. The court then ordered that "under all the circum-
stances of this case, defendant's conduct has been flagrant and
inexcusable and the sanctions provided by Rule 1.380(b) are ap-
propriate." The court thereupon struck the pleadings of Chase
Manhattan Mortgage & Realty Trust.
On appeal the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held
that the general rule with regard to sanctions is that they must be
applied only in extreme circumstances where willful noncompliance.
with the court's order is shown by the record. The court found that





An action may be dismissed by plaintiff without order of court
(i) by serving or during trial, by stating on the record, a notice of
dismissal at any time before a hearing on motion for summary
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judgment, or if none is served or if such motion is denied, before
retirement of the jury in a case tried before a jury, or before
submission of a nonjury case to the court for decision.
In Fears v. Lunsford6 after plaintiff had put on her case, and outside
of the presence of the jury, the judge announced his intention to
direct a verdict in favor of defendant. At that point, plaintiff took
a voluntary dismissal. The judge entered an order approving the
voluntary dismissal, but dismissed the suit with prejudice. Upon
plaintiff's appeal the District Court of Appeal, First District, af-
firmed. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed, holding that even
though the judge had announced a directed verdict in favor of defen-
dant, the announcement had not been made in front of the jury, and
therefore it was improper for the trial court to dismiss the cause with
prejudice. The court followed the letter of the rule which provides
that a plaintiff has an absolute right to take a voluntary dismissal
prior to the submission of the case to the jury.
Justice England, dissenting, noted that Rule 1.420 provides
that, in a nonjury case, a voluntary dismissal may only be taken
prior to the submission of the case to the court for a decision. He
found no apparent difference between that aspect of the Rule and
the instant case. 7 A point had been reached where the fact-finding
process was separated from the court's domain of pronouncing the
law. The effect of the court's decision, Justice England argued, was
to give the plaintiff an opportunity to relitigate an issue which was
already tried and found wanting as a matter of law. Justice Overton
concurred in the decision, but disagreed with the rule as it is writ-
ten, because of the result which it allowed. 8
B. Failure to Prosecute
Rule 1.420(e) has been amended to prevent dismissal on the
court's own motion for mere inactivity, unless one year has lapsed
since the occurrence of activity of record. Nonrecord activity is no
longer sufficient to toll the one year period. 9
Prior to the aforementioned rule change, it generally was recog-
nized that any action, record or non-record, taken during a one year
56. 314 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1975), noted at 30 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1092 (1976).
57. Id. at 580.
58. Id. at 579-80.
59. In re The Florida Bar, Rules of Civil Procedure, 339 So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. 1976).
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period could be asserted as a basis for precluding dismissal for fail-
ure to prosecute if the action taken was intended to hasten the suit
toward judgment. 0 However, a mere change of attorneys and the
filing of a notice of appearance was insufficient action under the
rules to foreclose dismissal."
Rule 1.420(e) only requires the dismissal of the case where it has
not been prosecuted towards final judgment for the requisite period
of time. Once a final judgment has been entered, the rule no longer
applies, even though the court has retained jurisdiction to dispose
of other matters in the cause."
Rowley v. Bankers United Life Assurance Co." involved the
court's inherent power to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute
with due diligence." Recognizing that courts possess this power,
Rowley held that where a court, upon its own motion, sends out
notice of hearing for a certain date, prior to the one year period, at
which it may hold a final hearing if uncontested, dispose of pending
motions, schedule pending matters for hearing, set the case for trial,
or dismiss the case without prejudice, and the court at this hearing,
dismisses the case without prejudice, such dismissal is error. The
District Court of Appeal, Third District, based its holding on the
lack of a "showing in the record of an unjustified failure by Rowley
to diligently prosecute his suit."65 Thus, although a court does have
the inherent power to dismiss prior to the running of the one year
period, there must, in addition to a lack of prosecution, be an unjus-
tified failure to prosecute diligently. No decision has as yet deter-
mined the effect of the amended rule on the court's power.
VIII. OFFER OF JUDGMENT
Rule 1.442 provides that at least ten days prior to trial a defen-
dant may offer to the adverse party that a judgment be taken
against him for money or property with costs then accrued. In the
event that plaintiff obtains judgment, but it is not more favorable
than the original offer, plaintiff must pay the costs incurred after
the making of the offer. This rule, although adopted in 1972, was
60. St. Anne Airways Corp. v. Larotonda, 308 So. 2d 129, 130 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
61. Id.
62. Ravel v. Ravel, 326 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
63. 311 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
64. See State ex rel. Crocker v. Chillingworth, 106 Fla. 323, 143 So. 346 (1932).
65. 311 So. 2d at 381 (emphasis added).
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interpreted for the first time during the survey period in three recent
cases.
In Insurance Co. of North America v. Twitty," defendant's offer
was larger than plaintiff's award. Therefore, from the date that the
offer was made, plaintiff was not entitled to recover any further
eogtg that he incurred. In addition, the court could allow costs in.
curred by the defendant in taking depositions if they were useful,
the costs for an attorney's fee for covering depositions in North
Carolina, and the amount of costs for court reporter expenses. In the
event the trial judge in his discretion on remand, granted these
costs, his final order should set off those costs against those to which
the plaintiff is entitled.
In the second case, Santiesteban v. McGrath,"7 the defendant
made an offer of judgment to the plaintiff and the plaintiff did not
obtain a judgment more favorable than the offer. After the trial, the
defendant moved for an entry of an order taxing costs pursuant to
Rule 1.422. The trial judge denied this motion on the basis that an
assessment of costs against the plaintiff was discretionary. On ap-
peal, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that
the express language of the rule leaves no doubt that reasonable
costs must be awarded to the defendant where, a proper offer of
judgment is made thereunder, the plaintiff does not accept the
offer, and the judgment finally obtained by the plaintiff is not
more favorable than the offer. The rule itself is couched in man-
datory terms and is designed to induce or influence a party to
settle litigation and obviate the necessity of a trial. 8
In the third case, Hernandez v. Travelers Insurance Co.,6" the
defendant made an offer of judgment of $600.00. The amount re-
covered by the plaintiff was $536.00, plus interest and attorneys'
fees. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that this
judgment exceeded the $600.00. The court reasoned that the offer
of judgment in itself was dispositive of the question inasmuch as the
offer was in favor of the plaintiff and her attorney and therefore, the
offer was interpreted as including damages for plaintiff and attor-
neys' fees for her lawyer. If the offer had been made only to the
66. 319 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
67. 320 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
68. Id. at 478.
69. 331 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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plaintiff, then the court could have awarded attorneys' fees for work
done up to the time of the offer of judgment. When the defendant
makes an offer of judgment, it stops the running of further costs and
attorneys' fees against him.
IX. DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
Although a party may obtain a default, this default may be set
aside under certain circumstances. Where a defendant alleges that
it has a meritorious defense, that the default occurred due to excus-
able neglect, and that it is willing to proceed immediately, the de-
fault should be set aside."
X. SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
A motion for summary judgment now must state with particu-
larity the grounds upon which it is based and the substantial mat-
ters of law to be argued. The committee notes to the rule change
state that this requirement is to eliminate surprise and to conform




The District Court of Appeal, First District, recently held that
a litigant cannot file a motion for summary judgment during the
course of trial.7 The court reasoned that summary judgment pro-,
ceedings are essentially pretrial in character and their principal
function is to avoid the time and the expense of a useless trial. When
a trial is held on the merits, the trial itself becomes the best test of
the parties' right to a judgment.
In Stanley v. Bellis73 the plaintiff moved, prior to the hearing,
for a continuation of the date for hearing the defendant's motion for
a summary judgment. The plaintiff requested the continuation so
that he might have a reasonable time to depose the out of state
defendants with regard to the issue of their liability. The District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that where these depositions
70. Knight v. Gainer, 310 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975) (per curiam). See North Shore
Hosp., Inc. v. Barber, 143 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1962); Metcalf v. Langston, 296 So. 2d 81 (Fla.
lst Dist. 1975) (requiring the submission of an affidavit or other proof of the veracity of facts
alleged in the motion to set aside).
71. In re The Florida Bar, Rules of Civil Procedure, 339 So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. 1976).
72. Howarth Trust v. Howarth, 310 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
73. 311 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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were essential to the consideration of the motion for summary judg-
ment, and where the court could discover no evidence that the
plaintiff's counsel had been dilatory or frivolous in his efforts, it was
an abuse of the court's discretion to deny the plaintiff's motion for
a continuance. The court stated: "[R]emembering that plaintiff's
day in court was in balance, we can perceive no reason not to extend
the time for hearing for a few weeks and every reason to do so.""
XI. JURY TRIAL
Two new paragraphs have been added to Rule 1.431. One
paragraph provides that all challenges shall be addressed to the
court outside the hearing of the jury in a manner selected by the
court. The purpose of this rule is that the jury panel will not become
aware of the nature of the challenge, the party making the chal-
lenge, or the basis of the court's ruling, if it is for cause. The other
paragraph establishes a procedure for interviewing jurors. A party
may move for an order permitting an interview of a juror to deter-
mine whether the verdict is subject to challenge. The motion must
be served within ten days after rendition of the verdict unless good
cause is shown. 5
In Gills v. Angelis"6 the trial court allowed the jury to take
depositions into the jury room. As a general rule this is improper."
However, in determining whether this error warrants setting aside
the verdict and granting a new trial, the critical issue becomes
whether the contents of the deposition are important enough to the
issues of the case to require a new trial. In this particular case, the
trial court granted a new trial because it determined that the depo-
sitions were significant to the issues. On appeal the District Court
of Appeal, Second District, refused to substitute its judgment on the
point, and upheld the trial court.
It is held generally that questions as to the right to jury trial
should be resolved, if at all possible, in favor of the party seeking
the jury trial since that right is protected and guaranteed by the
United States and Florida Constitutions. Where a party fails to
request a jury trial at the time that it should be demanded, after
74. Id. at 395.
75. In re The Florida Bar, Rules of Civil Procedure, 339 So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. 1976).




the initial responsive pleadings, the right is not waived if an
amended pleading raises a new issue in the case. In effect, the time
for filing a demand for jury trial is revived even though the demand
may have been waived at the time of the initial responsive plead-
ings."8
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that the
use of the words "and demands trial by jury" in a two count com-
plaint, at the conclusion of the second count, is sufficient to require
a jury trial on both counts and on all issues because the demand was
not specifically limited." This is a very liberal interpretation of Rule
1.430 and it would probably be better practice for a party to make
a short written demand for trial by jury separately or in the plead-
ings by specifically stating that this request applies to all issues so
triable.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has recognized
that a party may be entitled to a jury trial where only some of the
issues require it.8o Such is the case where a complaint is in equity
and a counterclaim is in law and the issues involved are so interre-
lated that separate trials are not practicable. Since a jury trial is
required for the action at law, it is then required for all issues.
The Supreme Court of Florida has held in Barth v. Florida
State Constructors Service, Inc.8 that "it is our view that, once a
demand for jury trial has been timely made, it takes affirmative
action on the part of a defendant to waive that constitutional
right."8 In Barth, a contractor and a homeowner entered into an
agreement for certain repairs to be done to the homeowner's dwell-
ing. Subsequently, the contractor filed a mechanic's lien against the
premises because the homeowner, after completion of about ninety
percent of the work, refused to allow the contractor back on the
premises to complete the work or to collect his fee. The homeowner
answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim alleging damages
to the property caused by unprofessional and unworkmanlike serv-
ices. The counterclaim included a demand for a jury trial. Subse-
quently, the case was tried by the court without a jury. The contrac-
tor had noticed the case for nonjury trial. The homeowner did not
78. Hollywood, Inc. v. Hollywood, 321 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1975).
79. Jerome v. William A. Reid Constr., Ltd., 307 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
80. Napolitano v. H.L. Robertson & Assocs., Inc., 311 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
81. 327 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976).
82. Id. at 15.
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object. After losing on the claim and the counterclaim, the home-
owner filed an appeal. The appellate court affirmed the lower
court's decision- 3 The Supreme Court reversed. The court reasoned
that, once demanded, a jury trial must be afforded unless affirma-
tively waived. Mere failure to object to the nonjury notice was insuf-
ficient.
XII. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Jury instructions can be very important. The failure of a court
to give a particular jury instruction may constitute reversible error.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, recently held that
where there is a reasonable possibility that the jury could have been
misled by failure to give a jury instruction, and the jury reasonably
could have concluded in a different manner, then a new trial should
be afforded. 4
The supreme court, has as of May 1976, adopted revisions to
Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases. 5
XI. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
In First Arlington Investment Corp. v. McGuire"5 the plaintiff
and the defendants stipulated to the facts at a pretrial conference.
When a verdict was returned against the defendants, they appealed
and alleged an issue for the granting of a new trial which was not
tried by consent of the parties during trial. Nor was the issue raised
at the pretrial conference. The issue was raised for the first time on
the motion for new trial. The District Court of Appeal, Second
District, held that since the issue was not tried effectively by con-
sent, either express or implied, and since it was raised for the first
time in the motion for new trial, the motion was properly denied.
Along the same line of reasoning, the Supreme Court of Florida
recently held that the issue of comparative negligence cannot be
raised for the first time on a motion for new trial or in an appellate
brief.87
83. 302 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
84. Howard v. State, 306 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
85. See FLA. STD. JUvY INST. at p. vii(d).
86. 311 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
87. Bonded Transp., Inc. v. Lee, 336 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1976). The decision of
Fitzsimmons v. City of Pensacola, 297 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), was disapproved
insofar as it conflicted with the supreme court's decision.
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XIV. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
In Fiber Crete Homes, Inc. v. Division of Administration"8 the
losing party's petition for a new trial was denied. Subsequently, that
party petitioned the court for a rehearing of the denial of its motion
for new trial. Since there is no provision in the rules of civil proce-
dure for a rehearing from a denial of the motion for new trial, the
motion was denied. The proper procedure would have been an ap-
peal. However, the trial court then proceeded upon its own motion
to grant a new trial under Rule 1.540 on the authority that a court
may act on its own motion under that rule. The District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, reversed and held that a court only can act
on its own motion for those reasons and circumstances set forth in
Rule 1.540. Since the trial court's order did not set forth the specific
reasons for granting relief, it was reversed.
The Fourth District reasoned that Rule 1.540 is intended to
provide relief from judgments, decrees, or orders under a limited set
of circumstances. It is not intended to serve as a substitute for a new
trial mechanism, nor as a substitute for appellate review of judicial
error. The appellate court's review of the file indicated that the trial
judge had sought to utilize the rule to correct what he perceived to
be a mistaken view of law and therefore his action was improper.
It is held generally that where excusable neglect is demon-
strated, a default judgment may be set aside. In Angelini v. Mobile
Home Village, Inc."9 the defendant chose to represent himself and
did not appear at the final hearing, although he was given due
notice. The defendant alleged that he misunderstood the phrase "or
as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard," in the notice for trial
and thought that it meant that the court would notify him of the
time and place of trial. Such misunderstanding of the notice was not
a sufficient ground to set aside the default judgment since the defen-
dant had done nothing to ascertain the date of trial or to determine
whether the trial would be continued.
88. 315 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
89. 310 So. 2d 776 (Fla. lst Dist. 1975).
19771
